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The vast majority of papers written about interest groups' political in uence focuses on the role of money in po l i ti c s . Business and interes t groups' participation in campaign nance, in the form of hard and soft money, has been the subject of hundreds of theoretical and empirical studies. Moreover, with the recent congressional moves to reform campaign na nc e laws, campaign nance studies have received a prominent position in public discourse.
There are tw o striking results about th i s line of academic work. First, political action committees (PACs) gave $245 million to congressional candidates in form of campaign contributions in th e 19 9 9 -2 00 0 election cycle (about $12 3 million annually), and corporations, unions, and interest groups gave $15 3 million in "soft money" to political parties during th e 1997-1998 election cycle (about $76 million annually).
1 Yet, Congress controls a $2 trillion budget, ne arl y 40 percent of which is di s c r e ti o n a r y spending. This raises a potential puzzle: why do in t e r e s t groups pa y so little ($200 million annually) to try to in uence policy? To answer th i s question, we tu r n to a se c o n d striking result from the academic li t e r a tu r e . There is little credible evidence any of the s e forms of campaign nance have any effect on policy ou t c o m e s (This, of course, le ave s the question open as to why PACs and corporations give money to candidates and pa rtie s at all.)
So what do e s matter? There is an emerging literature that looks at information as a more in uential instrument in affecting policy outcomes tha n campaign contributions . Information takes many forms: statistics, facts, arguments, forecasts, threats, commitments, signals, or so m e combination of the aforementi o n e d . If we assume, as most of political economy literature assumes, that the politician's objective is reelection (or election to a higher of ce), then the politician seeks in f o r m a t io n on how he r vo t e on a given issu e will affect the outcome of her ne x t election. There may be in t e r m e d i a t e forms of inform ationsuch as how many jobs a policy position will create, how constituent s will be affected by an yea or nay vote, whether business leaders will suppor t her in the next election-but ultimately the key piece of in f o r m a t i o n the politician cares about is how her reelection, or more speci cally votes, will be affected by the policy position sh e takes on the current issue. The manifestation of information transfer between intere s t groups and policymakers is lobbying. Lobbying is about in v e s t m e n t s in information accumulation, organization, and transfer by corporations and interest groups. Lobbying affects all levels of government, from civil se r v a n t s in administrativ e agencies to the highest le v e l s of elected politicians . Recent di s c l o su r e requirements imposed by Congress su g g e s t th a t reported lobbying expenditures are almost te n times that of all forms of campaign na nc e .
2 In 2000, $1.51 billion was reportedly spent on lobbying by interest groups.
3
But even th i s is not a large amount. Although numerous case studies suggest th a t lobbying and information transfer greatly affect voting be havio r in Congress and in uence decisionmakin g in administrative agencies, there has been little statistica l evidence. A recent study attempting to quantify th e return to lobbying estimates that a small amount of lobbying can have enormous monetary returns when th e constituent s lobbying are represented by a le gislato r who can deliver th e po l i c y . 4 Moreover, this work su g g e s t s that, on the margin, interest groups are optimizing by setting marginal bene t to marginal cost of lobbying .
5 These facts, to g e t h e r with the high investment made in lo b b y in g and the high return to lo b b y in g , le n d credence to the argument that there is an im porta n t empirical ju s t i cation for believing th a t lo b b y in g can have a large impact on polic y outcomes. Indeed, interest groups ne e d not sp e n d much. Once they provide the le g is l a t o r with th e key piece of credible information of the impact of her voting behavior on reelection, all additional information has little marginal value.
The articles and accompanying commentaries in this issue address lobbying and information in politics. They theoretically and empirically address how in f o r m a t i o n affects the be h a v io r of le gi s l a to r s , regulators, and interest groups. In th e rst paper, Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Tripathi (AST) integrate th e campaign nance literature with th e lobbying li t e r a t u r e to examine the access hypothesis, which posits that PAC contribution s do no t affect policy per se, but are used to signal to a legislator the value of in f o r m a t io n the interest group ha s on a particular issue. Thus PAC contribution s are mechanisms for interest groups to gain access to le gi s la to r s so that they can engage in a more valuable activitylo b b y in g . AST begin with an interesting empirical observation: although onl y one-fth of groups have both a PAC and a lobbyist, these groups account for 86 percent of PAC expenditures and 70 pe r c e n t of reported lobbying expenditures. This is suggestive of the tight linkage between PAC spending and lobbying . The paper explores this relationship further, showing tha t intere s t groups tha t lobb y heavily tend to evenly distribute their PAC money to le gislator s across the id e ol o g ic a l spectrum, focusing on legislators in positions of power. Interest groups that lobby ve r y little tend to focus their PAC money on close electoral contests. This, in tu r n , is consistent with the main prediction of th e access hypothesis : interest gr ou p s for whom lobbying is im por ta n t will ta rge t individu-2 . Ansolabehere , de Figueiredo and Snyder (2002) . 3 . Milyo et al. (2000) . 4 . There is a l s o surely unreported lobbying. 
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Brought to you by | Duke University Authenticated | 152.3.128.54 Download Date | 9/13/12 3:22 PM als in position of power, independent of partisanship (i.e., the legislators who are most able to deliver policy). Ideological groups, on the other hand, will tend to focus their money on li k e -m in d e d partisans in close elections.
In his commentary on this paper, Milyo nds one key contribution of AST is it s framework for distinguishin g between access-oriented PACs and ideological PACs. However, Milyo notes two additional facts. First, PAC contribution s are la r g e l y ir r e l e v a n t to policy outcomes and, second, AST show tha t PAC contributi o n s are highly correlated with lobbying expenditures. Ergo, lobbying is in d e p e n d e n t of po l i c y ou t c o m e s . While he is no t ready to embrace thi s conclusion in its entirety, he does note that the AST paper does point to a possible resolution for this problem when th e y suggest that future research should account for th e multiplicit y and heterogeneity of modes of political in uence across rms and interest groups. A disaggregatio n of different types of PACs and different types of lobbying, as is done in AST, may allow us to resolve thi s paradox.
In the second paper, "The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation, and Administrative Regulation," de Figueiredo and de Figueiredo (DD) examine lobbying of administrative agencies by interest groups. The paper is concerned with the role of su b s e q u e n t litigation and judicial review of administrativ e agency decisionmaking , and how that affects th e incentives of in t e r e s t gr o up s to lo b b y the agency in the rst stage. In doing this, DD in c or po r a t e the behavior of interest gr ou p s in t o the more tr aditiona l separation of powers models that have been developed in political science. In the formal model, in f o r m a t i o n is modeled as a resource transfer to th e regulator, in much th e way that information can be thought of as resources. DD initially sho w that wealthier interest groups are more likely to lo b b y . More interesting , though, is how judicial behavior can affect lobbying of administrative agencies. Modeling id e ol o g ic a l regulators and courts as responsive to resources, the y show that as courts become more biased against change, interest group lobbying investment s become smaller, and may be eliminated all together. However, as courts become more responsive to resources, th e effect it has on lobbying by interest groups is dependent upon the underlying id e o l o g y of the court relative to th e interest groups and regulator.
This link between in t e r e s t gr ou p lo b b y in g and the be havio r of courts is the focal point of Jo h n s to n ' s commentary on this pa p e r . He nd s the most important contributio n of the paper to be it s elucidation of how higher levels of con ict over preferred policy ou t c o m e s between the court and th e regulator de crea s e in c e n ti v e s to lobby. Indeed, lobbying can be eliminated altogether in the extreme case. Jo h n s to n th e n describes an alternative model, where rms must commit real resources, and where, under the right sort of statutor y regime, judicia l review may actually alter an agency's fundamental inc entiv e to regulate. 6 He shows in th i s set-up, as in DD, that an "extreme" form of judicial review can completely alter lobbying in c e n ti v e s . Thus, he argues, the result shown in DD is li k e l y ve r y ge ne r a l , and thus deserves closer attention.
In the th i r d pa p e r "Lobbying and Legislative Organization: The Effect of the Vote of Con dence Procedure," Bennedsen and Feldmann (BF) extend the analysis of lobbying to th e international arena in examining how th e structure of a legislature affects an interest group's incentive to lobby. In particular, they examine how the vote of con dence procedure, which is attached to each bill proposed in a parliamentary sy s t e m , might affect the ability of information to change a legislator's vote. This, in turn, affects the incentives of interest groups to collect and disseminate information to a legislator. BF develop an in nitely repeated game model of le g i s la ti v e bargaining with a nite interelection period and explore how parliamentary systems are di f f e r e n t from congressional syste m s . This is akin to having governments se r v e a nit e period of time before th e y must call an election, in the absence of a vote of con dence. The key detail is that because every vote in a pa r l ia m e n t a r y system can be a vote of con dence in th e current government, legislators in the majority of such a syste m have less in c e n ti v e to change their vote in response to information. Thus, intere s t groups have less in c e nt i v e to engage in information ga th e r in g and disseminatio n than th e y would in a congressional system, where a single vot e can fail, but a government will continue.
Baron, in his commentary, extends the BF paper to an in nitely tim e d in t e r e le c t io n model where le gi s l a to r s are assumed to use stationa r y stra tegie s (to avoid th e multiple equilibria inherent in in nit e ga me s) . This allows the government to be in power for a potentially in nite duration because, absent the vote of con dence, failure of the government is an exogenous, constant probabilit y event, re ected in th e actors' discount rates. BF sho w that if th e reelection is far enough away, there will be no lobbying at all in a parliamentary system . Baron sets a bound on th i s no-lobbyin g equilibrium based on the discount rate in the in nite period model. The tw o papers have similar results, despite their different in t e r e le c ti o n assumptions. In BF, as mandatory reelection get closer, th e r e will be an increase in lo b b y in g ; in Baron, as there is increasing uncertainty about government survivability (exogenous probability of survival is low), there is increased lobbying.
In th e nal paper, "Closure and Capture in Federal Advisory Committees," Karty describes th e history of federal advisory committees (primarily to adminis t r a t i v e agencies) and th e tendencies of th e s e committees to be captured by in t e r e s t groups. In th i s paper, Karty explains why advisory committees play an essential role in policymaking , and how they become susceptible to capture. The paper pr ov i d e s statistics on the origin, number, and composition of all federal advisory committees, and shows universities and research institute members are th e most he a v il y represented group on these committees, giving credence to the "expert" advisory na tu r e of th e s e committees. However, after subjecting his data to a variety of econometric tests, Karty argues that patterns of closure are consistent with capture theories.
In all, the papers extend both the th e or e t ic a l and empirical reach of the lo b b y in g and in uence li t e r a t u r e . They il l u st r a t e how information provision is im p o r ta n t across all rulemaking bodies-legislatures, agencies, and courts-and how theories of information transmission in po l i ti c s are portable across countries with different structures of government. Bringing together rigorous mathematical and statistical analysis, the papers elevate th e discourse on lobbying. Readers should nd these papers and commentaries useful in extending thei r thinkin g about lobbying and information in po l i ti c s .
